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Food Lion and the Media’s Liability for
Newsgathering Torts: A Symposium
Preview
Andrew B. Sims*
It is widely held that, with regard to the First Amendment,1 “crimes and torts committed in news gathering are
not protected.”2 Nevertheless, much controversy has arisen
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. Amherst
College, B.A. 1970; Harvard University, J.D. 1973; Law Clerk, Hon. Charles D.
Breitel, Chief Judge, New York Court of Appeals, Albany, New York. This Symposium Preview briefly introduces some of the issues that are discussed in a
panel discussion, Accountability of the Media in Investigations, as part of the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal’s (“IPLJ”) Fifth Annual Symposium, Current Issues in Telecommunications and Media Law. These issues are developed in detail in an article by the author. Andrew B. Sims, Food
for the Lions: The First Amendment and Excessive Media Liability for Newsgathering Torts (June 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the IPLJ). The
author would like to thank the editors of the IPLJ for inspiring this Symposium,
his fellow Symposium participants, and his research assistant, Mara Taylor, for
her assistance with this Symposium Preview.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment has been made applicable to
the states by incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
clause. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). Although the First
Amendment only speaks to Congress and the federal government, and would
have no application to the states or their subdivisions but for the Fourteenth
Amendment, see Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833), courts and commentators freely refer to the First Amendment and rarely to the Fourteenth Amendment in free speech/free press cases involving action by the states. A similar liberty will be taken by the author in this Symposium Preview.
It is generally accepted that state court enforcement of state common law or
statutory tort laws would constitute the requisite state action to trigger the applicability of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F.,
491 U.S. 524 (1989); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562
(1977); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 995 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that defendant’s tortious conduct was not immunized by First Amendment despite being
committed during newsgathering process); see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665 (1972) (holding that the First Amendment does not afford a media defendant
the right to conceal facts relevant to grand jury investigations of crimes or to
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over the verdict in Food Lion v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.,3 in
which a federal jury in North Carolina, on January 22, 1997,
awarded $5.5 million in punitive damages against the media
defendant for fraud, trespass, and breach of loyalty. Such liability arose because media defendant American Broadcasting Company/Capital Cities (“ABC”) instructed its investigators not to disclose their media connections in order to
gain employment in plaintiff’s supermarket, and to surreptitiously film alleged unsanitary meat-processing procedures.4
Part of this film was aired nationally on defendant’s PrimeTime Live program on November 5, 1992.5
Fortunately for ABC, the United States Supreme Court
ruled last year, in BMW of North America v. Gore,6 that excesconceal criminal conduct of sources); Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 24950 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding media defendant liable for torts of invasion of privacy
and intrusion in newsgathering process).
3. For previously reported decisions in this case, see Food Lion v. Capital Cities/ABC, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6962 (M.D.N.C. May 9, 1997) (memorandum opinion) (giving rationale for decision excluding proof of publication damages following jury verdict finding defendants liable for fraud, trespass, and breach of
duty of loyalty); 951 F. Supp. 1233 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (granting plaintiff’s motion
for summary judgment on defendants’ affirmative defenses of unclean hands
and in pari delicto); 951 F. Supp. 1224 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (denying defendants’ renewed motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims of both breach of fiduciary duty and
unfair and deceptive trade practices in violation of North Carolina’s Unfair
Trade Practices Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1996); 951 F. Supp. 1217 (M.D.N.C.
1996) (denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment on claims of fraud,
trespass, negligent supervision, civil conspiracy, and respondeat superior for
trespass); 887 F. Supp. 811 (M.D.N.C. 1995) (holding that state claims of fraud,
trespass, and civil conspiracy did not warrant dismissal, that claims for violations of federal wiretapping statutes warranted dismissal, and claims for negligent supervision, respondeat superior liability, breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud, unfair and deceptive trade practices, warranted deferment; that
ABC’s acts did not constitute pattern of racketeering as required to establish
RICO violation; and that plaintiff could not recover damages for injuries to its
reputation as result of broadcast).
4. For an excellent summary of the facts surrounding the Food Lion controversy and the jury verdict, see Amy Singer, Food, Lies, and Videotape, AM. LAW.,
Apr. 1997, at 56.
5. PrimeTime Live (ABC television broadcast, Nov. 5, 1992).
6. 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996) (holding that an award of $2 million in punitive
damages for a distributor’s fraudulent failure to disclose the repainting of a new
BMW automobile was “grossly excessive” and violated 14th Amendment due
process guarantee).
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sive punitive damages violate the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause. In so holding, the Court posited a
guidepost, in the form of a three-prong test, to determine
whether a punitive damage award is unconstitutionally excessive under the Fourteenth Amendment.7 The test requires courts to consider: (1) the degree of reprehensibility
of the defendant’s conduct;8 (2) the ratio of the punitive
damage award to the compensatory damage award;9 and (3)
the difference between the punitive damage award and the
civil or criminal sanctions that could be imposed for comparable conduct.10 On appeal,11 the Fourth Circuit is likely to
overturn the punitive damage award against ABC in Food
Lion and remand the decision for retrial,12 because the award
is vulnerable under two, if not three, of the BMW guideposts.13
Whether or not the media defendant’s conduct was “reprehensible”—the first of the BMW guideposts or indicia14—is
debatable,15 but the issue might well be resolved in ABC’s
7. Id. at 1598.
8. Id. at 1599.
9. Id. at 1601.
10. Id. at 1603.
11. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v. Food Lion, No. 96-2320 (4th Cir. argued May
9, 1997).
12. The Fourth Circuit could grant a remittitur of its own volition, offering
Food Lion the option of accepting a specific reduction of its punitive damage
award in lieu of a new trial. Cf. Martin v. Fleissner GmbH, 741 F.2d 61, 65 (4th
Cir. 1984) (holding that an appellate remittitur might be granted as to an award
of actual damages where the amount assessed “is ‘so shockingly excessive as
manifestly to show that the jury was actuated by caprice, passion or prejudice’”)
(quoting Hicks v. Herring, 144 S.E.2d 151, 154 (S.C. 1965)); see generally Eric
Schnapper, Judges Against Juries—Appellate Review of Federal Civil Jury Verdicts,
1989 WISC. L. REV. 237 (1989); Irene D. Sann, Remittiturs (and Additurs) in the Federal Courts: An Evaluation with Suggested Alternatives, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 157,
197 n.113 (1987).
13. See Marcia Coyle, BMW Punies Ruling May Upend Food Lion Verdict,
NAT’L L.J., Feb. 3, 1997, at A9; Stuart Taylor, Jr., Smashing Undercover Journalism,
LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 17, 1997, at 23.
14. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1599.
15. The jury may have found the defendants’ behavior to have been “reprehensible” because of submitted evidence that the ABC reporters might have
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favor if consideration of its newsgathering function and
purpose, along with the First Amendment interests inherent
therein, are taken into account. The second indicium—the
“disproportionality” of the punitive damage award16—is
staggering. The ratio of punitive to compensatory damages
in Food Lion is nearly 4,000:1,17 compared to a ratio of only
500:1, deemed unconstitutionally disproportionate in
BMW.18 The third indicium—the “excessiveness” of the
damages—is evaluated by measuring the difference between
the punitive damage award and the civil or criminal sanctions that could be imposed for comparable misconduct.19
There is no North Carolina criminal statute leveling a fine of
$5.5 million for fraud in an employment application,20 nor
have there been comparable recoveries for compensatory
damages in civil cases.21 Violation of North Carolina’s Unfair Trade Practices Act (“UTPA”),22 with which the Food

“staged” various incidents for the purpose of making Food Lion’s working conditions look unsanitary, including, inter alia, failing to throw away rotten food,
failing to clean a meat saw, and even “sabotaging” a hot water heater needed for
equipment cleaning. See Food Lion, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6962, at *19-21. Notably,
however, Judge Tilley ruled that none of the alleged “staged incidents” could,
under North Carolina or South Carolina law, be deemed to be the proximate
cause of the $5.5 billion “publication damages” that Food Lion alleged. Id. at *2131; see generally Food Lion, Fraud and Free Speech, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Feb.
17, 1997 (Counsel Connect Round Table).
16. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1601.
17. Compensatory damages in Food Lion were $1,402 and punitive damages
were $2 million. See Singer, supra note 4, at 56.
18. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1602-03.
19. Id. at 1603.
20. Cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. §14-100 (1996) (making it illegal to obtain property
by false pretenses and “punished by no less than 4 months nor more than 10
years, and fined, in the discretion of the court”).
21. Cf. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729 (West Supp. 1996) (permitting the United States
government to sue a federal employee, who obtained his or her employment by
way of fraud on an employment application, for recovery of a forfeiture of between $5,000 and $10,000; and also treble damages, with “damages” possibly
based on restitution of salary paid); see, e.g., United States v. Johnston, 138 F.
Supp. 525 (W.D. Okla. 1956) (federal government claim for damages under the
predecessor False Claims Statute, 31 U.S.C.A. § 231 (West Supp. 1996)).
22. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-1.1 to -16.2 (1996).
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Lion defendants are charged,23 would only provide for an
automatic trebling of the actual damage award.24
If it is likely that the Fourth Circuit will reverse or reduce
Food Lion’s punative damage award, Food Lion nevertheless
raises the controversial issue of whether the media should be
entitled to some First Amendment immunity, at least as to
excessive punitive damage awards, if not as to liability for
some newsgathering torts.25 While ABC would be gratified
to see its Food Lion punitive damages reduced under the
BMW principles,26 what the media giant would undoubtedly
much prefer is judicial recognition of a First Amendment
privilege to engage in minor, non-criminal newsgathering
torts either without legal liability, or at least without the assessment of any punitive damages if the tort-generated
speech is truthful, of public concern, and is not legally contested as being otherwise in defamation actions.27
Media defendants like ABC, who want explicit recognition of such a First Amendment immunity, argue that tort
23. As of May 1997, the district court had not yet determined whether the
acts of the defendants had violated the UTPA. See Food Lion, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6962, at *28-29. This determination must be made by the court as a matter
of law. Hardy v. Toler, 218 S.E.2d 342, 346 (N.C.), cert. granted, 214 S.E.2d 431
(N.C.), modified, 218 S.E.2d 342 (N.C. 1975).
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16; see Peterson v. Bozzano, 183 B.R. 735 (Bankr.
M.D.N.C. 1995).
25. See generally Robert M. O’Neil, Tainted Sources: First Amendment Rights
and Journalistic Wrongs, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1005 (1996); Sandra S. Baron et
al., Tortious Interference: The Limits of Common Law Liability for Newsgathering, 4
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1027 (1996); Jane E. Kirtley, Vanity and Vexation: Shifting
the Focus to Media Conduct, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1069 (1996); John J. Walsh et
al., Media Misbehavior and the Wages of Sin: The Constitutionality of Consequential
Damages for Publication of Ill-Gotten Information, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1111
(1996); Paul A. Lebel, The Constitutional Interest in Getting the News: Toward a First
Amendment Protection from Tort Liability for Surreptitious Newsgathering, 4 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1145 (1996).
26. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion for New Trial or
Remittitur of Punitive Damage Award, Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC,
Inc., No. 92-00592 (M.D.N.C. 1997).
27. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Judgment as a
Matter of Constitutional Law on Punitive Damages, Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc., No. 95-00513 (M.D.N.C. 1997).
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actions and large damage awards, such as those in Food Lion,
chill the media’s ability to engage in investigative reporting
necessary to bring important problems to the public’s attention.28 The media thus claim a special “watchdog” function
in society which they feel has been vindicated by their history, and of which the First Amendment should take cognizance.29 If they accept these arguments, courts might want
to expressly acknowledge the constraints of the First
Amendment on state tort law in a more forceful and unambiguous manner than would be achieved by merely leaving
the media defendants to their BMW due process defense.
BMW is, after all, merely a due process rule of general
applicability,30 theoretically predicated on a low-tier, rational
basis standard of review.31 While First Amendment concerns might no doubt be factored into the first BMW indicium of “reprehensibility,” query whether there should not
be some separate and independent First Amendment immunity principles recognized in this area. Media defendants
would point out that most of their tort-generated speech is
entitled to high-tier First Amendment protection, requiring
“compelling” government reasons for directly burdening the
liberty, with the law “narrowly drawn” to achieve those
ends.32 The minor newsgathering torts asserted to be necessary to generate this speech should arguably be protected
against excessive damage awards by something more than
low-tier, “rational basis” due process.
Moreover, BMW says nothing about the problem of excessive compensatory damage awards for newsgathering
torts. Indeed, Food Lion does not present this issue on appeal

28. Id. at 13-14.
29. Id. at 10-12.
30. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1592-93 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV).
31. Under this standard, the government is required to show that the law is
rationally-related to a valid or legitimate purpose. See United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-54 (1938).
32. See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989).

1997]

SYMPOSIUM PREVIEW

395

because, at the trial level, Judge Tilley had rejected the plaintiff’s attempt to have the damages from publication considered by the jury as proximately caused by the newsgathering
torts,33 and because the jury’s ultimate award of compensatory damages for the torts proper was a modest one.34 It is
nevertheless noteworthy that a higher award of compensatory damages would in turn have reduced the “disproporationality” of the punitive damage award under BMW’s second indicium.35
Should the Fourth Circuit go beyond BMW and reconsider whether the media enjoys a First Amendment privilege, or immunity from liability, for newsgathering torts, it
might be useful to consider the following issues:

33. Food Lion, 887 F. Supp. at 822-24. Including the damages from publication in the measurement of the damages for the predicate newsgathering torts,
on a theory of proximate causation, receives some support in state common law
decisions. See, e.g., Dietemann v. Time Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 250 (9th Cir. 1971); Belluomo v. Kake TV & Radio, Inc., 596 P.2d 832, 842 (Kan. App. 1979); Prahl v.
Brosamle, 295 N.W.2d 768, 781-82 (Wis. 1980). But see Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d
701 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969); Costlow v. Cusimano, 34
A.D.2d 196 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970); see generally James F. King & Frederick T.
Muto, Compensatory Damages for Newsgathering Torts: Towards a Workable Standard, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 919 (1981); Rex S. Heinke, Added Damages for Publication Should not be Available in Intrusion-Trespass Cases without Independent Justification, 5 COMM. LAW. 1, 6 (1983).
Food Lion had argued that such reputational damages should be recoverable whether or not the publication was truthful. 887 F. Supp. at 822. However,
Judge Tilley accepted ABC’s argument, predicated on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), “that a public figure cannot
use a law of general applicability to recover reputation damages without establishing the strict requirements of a defamation claim.” 887 F. Supp. at 821. Food
Lion did not sue ABC for defamation, apparently asserting that the statute of
limitations had run before it had gathered sufficient evidence to prove actual
malice as required by New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See Singer,
supra note 4, at 58. Outside of court, however, Food Lion continues to contest the
truthfulness of the PrimeTime Live broadcast, and asserts that it unsuccessfully
attempted to add a libel claim to its lawsuit in 1995. Id. at 65. ABC, in response,
has challenged Food Lion to lift the “confidential” designation of Food Lion’s
internal documents that ABC obtained on discovery, and which it believes support the substantial truthfulness of its broadcast. Id.
34. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
35. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.

396

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[7:389

(1) Which newsgathering torts would properly be included within, and which would be excluded from, such a
First Amendment privilege/immunity, and which would
not;
(2) Whether the First Amendment privilege should extend to a complete immunity from civil liability for commission of these newsgathering torts, or whether immunity
should be limited to excessive liability for the newsgathering
torts, and if the latter, whether to excessive damages in any
form—punitive, compensatory, or a combination thereof—or
to punitive damages only;
(3) On what “conditions” might such an immunity, from
either liability or excessive damages, be predicated;
(4) If the court chose to limit First Amendment protection to a ban on excessive punitive damages for newsgathering torts, but under a standard more rigorous than the BMW
due process rule, what factors might it weigh in assessing
whether a specific punitive damage award is unconstitutionally excessive in light of the First Amendment?
Prominent in any discussion of a First Amendment immunity for newsgathering torts would be a comparison to
First Amendment law limiting the recovery of civil tort
damages for defamation36 in cases brought by public figures
and public officials, or by others where the alleged defamations related to matters of public concern, under the doctrine
of New York Times v. Sullivan37 and its progeny.38 Indeed,
this comparison might be made at more than one level. For
example, the newsgathering torts might be generally compared to these constitutionalized categories of defamation to
assess whether recognition of any First Amendment immu-

36. See, e.g., Baron, supra note 25, at 1062; Lebel, supra note 25, at 1148-49.
37. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
38. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Dunn & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985); see also infra note 40
and accompanying text (describing the Gertz and Greenmoss decisions).
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nity for the media for the newsgathering torts might serve
First Amendment interests of comparable significance.
The issue of constitutionalized defamation would also
arise because of the more specific concern that media targets
like Food Lion are bringing newsgathering tort actions to
circumvent the significant constitutional bulwarks erected
by the Supreme Court in defamation cases.39 Food Lion did
not sue ABC for defamation, apparently asserting that the
statute of limitations had run before it had gathered sufficient evidence to meet the proof of “actual malice” requirement of Sullivan.40 The suspicion that Food Lion was trying
to circumvent the Sullivan requirements led Judge Tilley to
reject the plaintiff’s argument that the measurement of damages for the newsgathering torts should include its reputational damages from ABC’s broadcast regardless of the truth
or falsity thereof41—a decision which no doubt significantly
reduced ABC’s compensatory damages.42
39. See supra note 33 (discussing Sullivan and its progeny).
40. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. In order to establish liability
for defamation under the rule of Sullivan and its progeny, public officials and
public figures must not only prove “actual malice”—defined as “knowledge of
the falsity or reckless disregard of the truth,” Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80, but also
must do so with clear and convincing clarity. Id. at 285-86.
Non-Sullivan plaintiffs alleged to have been defamed as to matters of public
concern bear the same burden of proof as to “actual malice” in order to recover
presumed or punitive damages, but may otherwise recover provable special or
general damages under state law standards which do not award injury without
fault. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347-50, as clarified by Greenmoss, 472 U.S. at 757-61.
Both Sullivan- and Gertz-type plaintiffs bear the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence on the issue of falsity. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.
v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776-77 (1986). “Substantial truth” is a defense. Masson v.
New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 516-17 (1991).
41. Food Lion, 887 F. Supp. at 822-24; see supra note 33 and accompanying
text.
42. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. The ABC/PrimeTime Live
broadcast apparently did have a devastating impact on Food Lion’s reputation:
“Its stock lost almost half of its value in the year following the broadcast. At
least 88 stores were closed. More than 1,000 employees were laid off.” Singer,
supra note 4, at 58.
On December 20, 1996, following a jury verdict finding the defendants liable
for fraud, trespass, and breach of the duty of loyalty, Judge Tilley informed the
parties that proof of damages resulting from “lost profits, lost sales, diminished
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Such “anti-circumvention” analysis could be taken a significant step further and argued as the basis for a general
theory of First Amendment immunity from liability for minor newsgathering torts. Perhaps the most significant
statement of this position is that of the eminent Judge Richard A. Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit in J.H. Desnick,
M.D. Eye Service v. ABC,43 a case also involving ABC and
PrimeTime Live:
Today’s ‘tabloid’ style investigative television reportage . . . is entitled to all the safeguards with which the
Supreme Court has surrounded liability for defamation. And it is entitled to them regardless of the name
of the tort, and, we add, regardless of whether the tort
suit is aimed at the content of the broadcast or the
production of the broadcast. If the broadcast itself
does not contain actionable defamation, and no established rights are invaded in the process of creating it
(for the media have no general immunity from tort or
contract liability), then the target has no legal remedy
even if the investigatory tactics used by the network
are surreptitious, confrontational, unscrupulous, and
ungentlemanly.44
stock value or anything of that nature” would not be permitted. See Food Lion,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6962, at *5 n.2. Judge Tilley gave his rationale for this ruling in a memorandum opinion filed May 9, 1997. Id. His theory was that, under
the applicable laws of North Carolina and South Carolina, such “publication
damages” could not be viewed as directly attributable to, and therefore proximately caused by, the defendants’ torts. Id. Judge Tilley avoided the question of
whether such recovery might be barred by the First Amendment.
43. 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995).
44. Id. at 1355 (citations omitted). Judge Posner’s quoted remarks regarding
the First Amendment are arguably dicta in Desnick, because the Seventh Circuit
had previously concluded therein that the media defendants had not committed
the alleged common law torts of trespass, privacy invasion and fraud, nor had
they violated the relevant federal or state statutes limiting electronic surveillance
by having individuals with hidden cameras pose as patients requesting eye examinations at defendant’s ophthalmic centers specializing in cataract surgery. Id.
at 1351-55.
Critical to the holding in Desnick that no newsgathering torts had been
committed was Judge Posner’s conclusion that the media’s inducement of the
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It is hoped that this Symposium panel, Accountability of
the Media in Investigations, will give us valuable insights into
these constitutional and other legal issues that will confront
the Fourth Circuit in the Food Lion appeal, as well as other
judges and federal and state legislators in the years to come.

target’s consent through fraud or misrepresentation might not always negate
that consent. Id. at 1351. Notably, Judge Tilley, in denying ABC’s motion for
summary judgment in Food Lion, thought Desnick to be distinguishable, in this
regard, on its facts. Unlike the eye examination offices in Desnick, to which anyone expressing a desire for ophthalmic services had access, Food Lion had allowed the PrimeTime Live reporters access to areas to which only its employees
had access. These reporters, Tilley concluded, were really ABC employees, and a
reasonable jury might find that their presence at Food Lion was purely incidental
to their jobs with PrimeTime Live. Food Lion, 951 F. Supp. at 1222-24.
The approach of Judge Posner and the Seventh Circuit in Desnick, in effect
reading the common law torts “small” by reinterpreting ancient forms of action
so as to free the media from liability for non-criminal newsgathering torts, might
provide an additional option for the Fourth Circuit in considering the Food Lion
appeal.

